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Federal copyright law' prohibits unauthorized copying of original works
1. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). The copyright clause of the Constitution authorizes Con-
gress to secure for authors the exclusive rights to their writings for limited times. U.S. CONST.,
Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. Copyright reflects the economic philosophy that encouragement of individual
efforts through personal gain advances the public welfare by assuring that authors receive
rewards commensurate with their endeavors. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Imperial
Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1972). The first federal copyright statute,
which Congress enacted in 1790, protected only maps, charts, and books. Act of May 31, 1790, 1
Stat. 124. Since 1790, Congress periodically has expanded the scope of copyright protection in
response to technological advances and societal demands. See Act of April 29, 1802, 2 Stat. 171
(historical and other prints); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, 4 Stat. 436 (musical compositions); Act of Aug.
18, 1856, 11 Stat. 138 (public performance of printed drama); Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 540
(photographs and negatives); Act of July 8, 1870, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (paintings, drawings,
chromos, statues, and statuary intended as works of fine art).
In 1909, Congress enacted a major revision of the federal copyright law by explicitly in-
cluding motion pictures, compilations and periodicals, and speeches in the scope of copyright.
See Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act), Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075. The 1909 Act granted
authors the exclusive right to copy their works for a period of 28 years from the date of first
publication of the work. Id. § 24. At the expiration of the first 28 year period of copyright pro-
tection, the copyright owner could renew the copyright for an additional 28 years simply by filing
an application for renewal with the copyright office of the Library of Congress. Id. The 1909 Act
only protected works that an author fixed in a medium of expression from which a human being
could perceive the work without the aid of special training or equipment. See White-Smith Music
Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1908) (punched paper roll designed to operate
mechanical player piano did not constitute protectible copy since human being could not perceive
music without special training). Moreover, the 1909 Act protected an author's writings only when
an author published his work. See 1909 Act, § 10, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075. The 1909
Act reserved for authors an enumerated list of exclusive rights, including the rights to copy,
print, reprint, publish, vend, and translate the work. Id. § 1. State common-law copyright pro-
tected unpublished works and categories of works that the 1909 Act did not protect. See Golds-
tein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 558 (1973) (state law prohibiting unauthorized duplication of
phonograph records and tapes did not violate supremacy clause of Constitution even though
federal copyright law did not prohibit duplication).
In 1976, Congress revised the federal copyright law to provide copyright protection to a
broad category of works that Congress denominated as original works of authorship. See
Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act) § 102(a), Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)) (copyright subsists in original works of authorship); KITCH & PERLMAN,
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 622-23 (1979) (1976 Act changed basic struc-
ture of American copyright law). Although the 1976 Act defines several categories of works of
authorship, such as literary, musical, and dramatic works, Congress did not intend the enumer-
ation of categories to be exclusive. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (works of authorship include
enumerated categories). Under the 1976 Act, the subject matter of copyright may include forms
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of authorship. 2 A copyright owner's rights arise when he fixes his works in
any tangible medium of expression.' Copyright protects an author's form of
expression, but does not grant an author a monopoly over the idea that the
work expresses.' Copyright seeks to advance the public welfare by ensuring
that authors receive compensation that reflects the author's originality and
of authorship unforeseen when Congress adopted the act. See H.R. REP. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5664 (authors continually
develop new and unforeseeable forms of expression that copyright protects).
Under the 1976 Act, federal copyright protection attaches as soon as an author fixes his
work in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Furthermore, the 1976 Act
expressly preempts the application of state copyright laws to subject matter within the scope of
federal copyright protection. Id. § 301. Since federal copyright attaches at the time an author
fixes a work in a tangible medium of expression, state law can provide little, if any, protection to
works of authorship. See KITCH & PERLMAN, supra, at 624 (state law may protect works con-
ceived but not reduced to writing or otherwise recorded).
The 1976 Act protects copyrighted works for the life of the author plus fifty years or, in the
case of corporate or anonymous authors, seventy-five years from the date of fixation of the
work. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1982). The 1976 Act reserves for authors a short list of broadly defined
exclusive rights. Id. § 106. Authors retain the exclusive right to exploit their works by reproduc-
tion, preparation of derivative works, distribution of copies, performance, and display. Id.
Rather than enumerating an exhaustive list of exclusive rights, as Congress did in the 1909 Act, in
the 1976 Act Congress enunciated broad, exclusive exploitation rights along with a specific list of
limitations on the author's right to maintain the exclusivity of his work. Id. §§ 106-108; see
KITcr & PERLMAN, supra, at 622-23 (guiding principle of 1976 Act is that owner has exclusive
right to exploit work).
2. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)
(originality means that work owes its origin to its author). In the context of copyright law, an au-
thor's work is original if the work is more than a mere copy of another work. Id.; accord Frank-
lin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
880 (1978). The originality requirement does not demand ingenuity, novelty, or aesthetic merit.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5664; see Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102-03 (originality requires no large measure of novel-
ty); accord Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 102(2) (1982). The fixation requirement, which acts as a prerequisite to
statutory copyright protection, requires an author to record his work in some stable medium.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5665. A work is fixed when the work is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit
perception, reproduction, or communication of the work for more than a transitory duration. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The 1976 Act expressly recognizes that an author may fix his work in a
tangible medium of expression even though a machine or device is necessary to perceive the
work. Id. § 102(a). Phonorecords, magnetic tapes and disks, and computer punch cards are
several examples of acceptable media that require the use of special equipment to perceive the
copyrighted work. Id. § 101; H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEWS, 5659, 5665. A particular medium of expression may
qualify under the 1976 Act even though the medium is not yet in existence. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1982); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5659, 5665.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101 (1879) (use of
accounting system does not infringe copyright owner's form of expression); infra notes 41-49 and
accompanying text (discussing dichotomy between idea and expression).
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creativity.' The Copyright Revision Act of 1976 (1976 Act)6 encompasses
various forms of expressions, including computer programs. 7 A computer
program is the set of instructions that a computer programmer writes which
cause a computer to react in a certain manner.' The extension of copyright
protection to computer software9 has forced the federal judiciary to examine
the esoteric details of computer technology.II To date, the judicial foray into
this technical minutiae has resulted in broad protection for computer soft-
ware." Several courts recently have held that copyright protects even the
operating system of a computer.'2 These recent decisions raise the issue of
5. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
6. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. (1982));
see supra note I (discussing major aspects of 1976 Act).
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining computer program as set of instructions that bring
about certain results when used in computer); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (computer programs are works of authorship under 1976
Act); infra notes 14-40 and accompanying text (discussing computer terminology).
The terms "computer" and "computer program" are subject to a variety of definitions de-
pending on the conceptual perspective and purposes of the person using the terms. Rosen, Soft-
ware, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 1283 (A. Ralston & C. Meek eds. 1976). One may
view a computer merely as a piece of hardware that stores and manipulates electrical impulses.
Id. From a more conceptual perspective, one may think of a computer as a structured composite
of hardware and software layers. H. LORIN & H. DEITEL, OPERATING SYSTEMS 1 (1981); see infra
notes 14-40 and accompanying text (describing computer hardware and software). People
typically use the term computer, however, to refer to the physical aspects of the computer
system, which also is known as hardware. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 9-11 (1978) (referring to computers as
machines) [hereinafter cited as CONTU FINAL REPORT]. Computer programs refer to the written
instructions that, when converted into electrical impulses, operate the computer. See id.; infra
notes 32-40 and accompanying text (describing computer software).
8. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (discussing computer software).
9. See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text (computer software includes computer
programs).
10. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d
Cir. 1983) (computer operating systems are copyrightable), cert. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 690 (1984);
Williams Elecs., Inc., v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982) (computer programs
expressed in object code are copyrightable); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (object code program fixed in read-only memory of computer is copyrightable);
infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (read-only memory stores permanent information); in-
fra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (object code constitutes machine-readable phase of com-
puter program); infra note 33 (operating system controls internal management of computer). See
generally Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARv. L. REV.
1723 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Object Code]; Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Pro-
grams in Read Only Memory Chips, 11 HoFSTrA L. REv. 329 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
MAemory Chipsl.
11. See infra notes 136-146 and accompanying text (courts have protected all phases of
computer programs regardless of storage medium).
12. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., No. 83-5875, slip op. at 698 (9th Cir.
Feb. 8, 1984) (copyright recognizes no distinction between operating system program and ap-
plication program); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d
Cir. 1983) (copyright does not distinguish between programs based upon program's function),
cert. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 690 (1984).
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whether the courts have applied the copyright laws too generously and have
granted benefits intended for developers of computer software to manufac-
turers of computer hardware.' 3
Microcomputer hardware consists of several components.14 The central
processing unit (CPU) is the conceptual center of the computer." The CPU
accepts, decodes, and executes instructions while controlling the timing of all
processes within the computer.' 6 The CPU communicates with computer pro-
grammers and operators by accepting input from the operator's keyboard and
writing output to the operator's video display terminal or printer. ' The CPU
also responds to instructions and information that the CPU receives from
other parts of the computer, such as the computer's random-access memory
(RAM)." RAM acts as the CPU's primary repository for information and in-
structions and contains thousands of distinct locations for the storage of the
electrical signals that drive the computer.' RAM allows the speedy storage,
retrieval, and manipulation of information.2"
Since RAM stores information in the form of electrical impulses, which
immediately fade as soon as the computer loses power or malfunctions, most
13. See infra notes 147-72 and accompanying text (discussing effect of extending copyright
protection to computer operating systems).
14. See infra notes 15-28 and accompanying text (describing essential components of com-
puter hardware); see also Wiatrowski & House, Microcomputers and Programming, in THE
McGRAw-HILL COMPUTER HANDBOOK, 25-1 (H. Helms ed. 1983) (microcomputers are computers
in which central processing unit consists of single integrated circuit chip).
15. See A. KHAMBATA, MICROPROCESSORS/MIcROCOMPUTERS: ARCHITECTURE, SOFrWARE
AND SYSTEMS 8-9 (1982) (central processing unit and its components constitute fundamental
building blocks of all digital computers). A digital computer is an electronic device that automa-
tically executes a sequence of operations on given data. Id. at 6. The presence or absence of a
single pulse of electricity that opens or closes the binary logic gates of the central processing unit
(CPU) represents a binary digit, or bit, of information. Id. As a matter of convention, the com-
puter industry has adopted the symbols of "1" and "0" to represent the presence or absence of
an electrical pulse. See K. SHORT, MICROPROCESSORS AND PROGRAMMED LOGIC 146 (1981) (binary
digits of I and 0 represent machine.language of computer). A continuous group of eight bits con-
stitutes a byte, or a single word in the computer's machine language. See A. KHAMBATA, supra,
at 6 (group of bits constitutes word); Wiatrowski & House, supra note 14, at 25-8 (eight con-
catenated bits constitute a byte). Each byte of electrical impulses may constitute either an in-
struction, which directs the CPU to act in a certain manner, or information, which constitutes
the data upon which the CPU acts. A. KHAMBATA, supra, at 6. Whether a particular byte con-
stitutes an instruction or information depends upon the significance that a computer programmer
attaches to the byte. Wiatrowski & House, supra note 14, at 25-8.
16. A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at 8. In addition to controlling fhe timing and syn-
chronization of computer processes, the CPU performs all arithmetic operations within the com-
puter. Id.
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id. at 7.
19. Id. The microcomputer's random-access memory (RAM) is a semiconductor chip or
group of semiconductor chips that stores both instructions and information. Id. The CPU can




computers employ off-line storage devices that allow long-term retention of
information.2' Floppy disks and cassette tapes constitute the most common
off-line information storage media for microcomputers." Storage of informa-
tion on magnetic media such as floppy disks or cassette tapes allows the com-
puter to refresh its memory quickly, without requiring the computer operator
to retype the data through the computer keyboard.2 3 Moreover, off-line
storage allows compatible microcomputer systems to exchange information. '
In addition to RAM and disk or tape drives, most microcomputer hard-
ware includes read-only memory (ROM) chips which permanetly store infor-
mation within the computer. 25 The ROM chip, unlike a magnetic tape or disk,
resides within the computer's hardware. 6 To the untrained eye, the ROM
chip is indistinguishable from any other integrated circuit located within the
circuitry of the machine. 7 ROM functions similarly to RAM since the CPU
may draw instructions from either RAM or ROM. 28 ROM differs from RAM
in that the CPU may not write instructions in ROM, but may replace infor-
mation or instructions in RAM at will. 29 More importantly, the information
21. See K. SHORT, supra note 12, at 355 (mass data storage systems allow storage and ex-
change of large quantities of information). The three most common types of mass storage media
available for use with microcomputers are punched paper tape, cassette tapes, and floppy disks.
Id. The paper tape medium consists of a roll or strip of paper or mylar plastic that contains
punched holes which correspond to bits of data. Id. Cassette tapes are the familiar magnetized
mylar tapes and plastic housings that comprise audio cassettes used in home stereos. Bartee, The
Memory Element, in THE MCGRAw-HILL COMPUTER HANDBOOK, at 7-69, (H. Helms ed. 1983).
Floppy disks are flexible disks of magnetized mylar that come in sizes of five-and-one-quarter or
eight inches in diameter. Id. at 7-61.
Each off-line storage medium enjoys the advantage over RAM storage of being inexpensive
and non-volatile. K. SHORT, supra note 15, at 355. A storage medium is non-volatile when the
medium retains information even though the computer's power is off. Id. Most RAMs lose in-
formation when the computer loses power and, therefore, are volatile. A. KHAMBATA, supra note
15, at 192. The ability to store information off-line also provides the computer with access to
more information than the computer could store at one time. K. SHORT, supra note 15, at 355;
see A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at 7 (computer may acquire data from external storage sources
when internal data memory is too small for given application).
22. See Bartee, supra note 21, at 7-61 (convenience and low price have broadened use of
floppy disks).
23. See id. at 7-22 (computer operator may interchange floppy disks easily).
24. See K. SHORT, supra note 15, at 355 (compatibility of storage media facilitates ex-
change and portability of information).
25. See id. at 54 (read-only memories store permanent information).
26. See Bartee, supra note 21, at 7-31 (read-only memories constitute permanent compon-
ent of computer's memory).
27. See id. (read-only memories are integrated circuit chips); see also Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 751 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (read-only memories are integral to circuitry of
computer).
28. A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at 182. Read-only memory (ROM) shares with RAM the
desirable characteristic of being able to provide information from any location in memory at the
same rate of speed. Id.
29. See id. at 181-82 (CPU may read and write on RAM but only may read from ROM).
The information stored in a given ROM chip is unalterable once the manufacturer completes the
1984] 1365
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in ROM does not disappear when the computer loses power.30 ROM,
therefore, permits the long-term storage of information that the computer
uses frequently.
31
The instuctions and information that operate the computer hardware are
called computer software.32 Software includes applications programs, which
instruct the computer to perform specific tasks, and operating systems pro-
grams, which facilitate the development and use of applications programs."
ROM. Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 854 n.1 (2nd Cir. 1982). Although in-
formation in ROM generally is permanent, several variations of ROMs exist that permit pro-
gramming by someone other than the manufacturer. A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at 184. Pro-
grammable ROMs (PROMs) allow a programmer in the field to install a program using special
equipment. Id. Like ROMs, a user may program a PROM only once. Id. A programmer may re-
program an erasable PROM (EPROM), however, by removing the EPROM chip from the com-
puter and exposing the EPROM to ultraviolet light for fifteen to twenty minutes. Id. at 184-85.
By using an electrically-erasable PROM (EEPROM), a programmer may reprogram the non-
volatile memory with the chip still in the computer. Wheeler, The Practical EEPROM, in BYTE,
July 1983, at 460. Some rewiring of the computer's circuitry, however, may be necessary to use
an EEPROM. Id. at 460-61.
30. A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at 182; see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (loss of power erases information in RAM but
does not affect ROM), cert. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 690 (1984).
31. A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at 185. ROMs typically contain a variety of frequently
used data such as trigonometric, multiplication, division, logarithm, and square root tables, as
well as operating systems programs such as compilers and bootstrap loaders. Id.; see infra note
33 and accompanying text (operating systems programs manage internal functions of computer);
infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (compilers translate source code into object code); infra
note 85 and accompanying text (bootstrap loader initiates computer's operation).
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (computer program is set of instructions used directly or in-
directly in computer to bring about certain result); CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 5 at 9-10
(computer programs consist of sets of instructions that one may use in limitless number of ways).
Some commentators use the term software generally to refer to all aspects of a computer system
that are not hardware. A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at 363. Other commentators, however, use
the term software interchangeably with the term computer program. See Hamacher, Vranesic, &
Zaky, Software, in THE MCGRAw-HILL COMPUTER HANDBOOK, at 8-1 (H. Helms ed. 1983) (soft-
ware refers to programs that run on computer); Wiatrowski & House, supra note 14, at 25-4
(software refers to programs and hardware refers to logic circuits).
33. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.
1983) (computer programs constitute either applications software or operating systems software),
cert. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 690 (1984). Applications software includes programs that prepare pay-
rolls, operate assembly lines, balance checkbooks, perform word processing, and play games. See
id. (applications programs are programs which perform tasks that make computers worthwhile
investments); CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
In contrast, operating systems software comprises the tools that facilitate the development
and use of application programs. A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at 367. A computer hardware
manufacturer generally develops an operating system for use on a single computer and provides a
copy of the operating system with the computer when sold. Id. An operating system manages the
internal functions of the computer that all applications programs commonly use. Id.; Hamacher,
Vranesic, & Zaky, supra note 32, at 8-2; see 714 F.2d at 1243 (operating systems manage internal
functions of computer or facilitate use of applications programs). The goal of an operating
system is to enhance the accessibility of the system, improve operational efficiency, and reduce
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All computer programs undergo various phases of development before they
actually can operate a computer.3 4 A computer programmer initially will write
a program in a high level computing language such as BASIC, FORTRAN, or
COBOL.3 1 The instructions that comprise the program, although esoteric, are
comprehensible to a person who is familiar with computer programming.3 6 A
the cost of programming by accomplishing tasks common to most users of a specific computer.
H. LORIN & H. DEITEL, supra note 7, at 25. Operating systems bridge the gap between the user's
needs and the hardware's characteristics. R. ECKHOUSE, JR., MINICOMPUTER SYSTEMS: ORGANIZ-
ATION AND PROGRAMMING (PDP-1 1) 226 (1975).
Although the distinction between applications software and operating systems software is in-
telligible in the abstract, no bright line actually distinguishes applications software from operat-
ing systems. See H. LORIN & H. DEITEL, supra note 7, at 25-26 (disagreement exists concerning
line between applications programs and operating systems). Whether a particular program is an
applications program or part of the operating system depends partly on convention and partly on
the history of the particular computer system's development and marketing. Id. at 26. Although
operating systems are not radically different from applications programs, the distinction is
worthwhile since applications programs must conform to the operating system of a given
machine to take advantage of the operating system's utilities. See P. BRINCH HANSEN, OPERATING
SYSTEM PRINCIPLES 3-4 (1973).
34. See A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at 364-67. Computer software development involves
a number of steps. Id. A software developer begins the programming process by verbally defin-
ing the problem to be solved. Id. at 364. Having defined the problem, a programmer will outline
a program that resolves the problem by designing a flowchart of the program. Id. The pro-
grammer will reduce the outline to a symbolic computer language by writing a source code pro-
gram in a high-level computer language. Id. at 366; see infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text
(discussing source code programs). The programmer will then use a number of software de-
velopment aids, including a computer, to convert the source code program into machine
language, or object code. A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at 366; see infra notes 39-40 and accom-
panying text (describing process of translation from source to object code).
35. See K. SHORT, MICROPROCESSORS AND PROGRAMMED LOGIC 149-153 (1981) (software
development process begins with design and coding and ends with debugging of machine level
object code program). BASIC, FORTRAN, and COBOL are examples of high level program-
ming languages. See Helms, Survey of High-Level Programming Languages, in THE McGRAw-
HILL COMPUTER HANDBOOK 12-3, 12-4 (H. Helms ed. 1983). BASIC stands for Beginners All-
purpose Symbolic Instruction Code. Id. FORTRAN stands for Formula Translator. Id. COBOL
stands for Common Business Oriented Language. Id. BASIC, FORTRAN, and COBOL are ex-
amples of high-level symbolic programming languages that employ jargon that is familiar to a
programmer who is writing programs in a field for which each language was designed. A. KHAM-
BATA, supra note 15, at 366, 370. COBOL, for instance, emphasizes business terminology
whereas FORTRAN emphasizes scientific operations. Id. at 370. As its name implies, BASIC is
comprehensible even to a layperson. See Lipson, Lawyer's Short Course in BASIC Computer
Language, 24 JURIMETRICS 154, 155 (1984). A simple BASIC program that will print the number
"7" on the operator's console when executed is as follows:
10 LET Al = 5
20 LET B = SQR (4)
30 PRINT Al + B
40 END
See id. at 157.
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (programmer is familiar with programming
language jargon).
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program written in a high level language is known as source code." Even
though source code may reside on any number of media that a computer can
read, such as punched cards, floppy disks, or cassette tape, source code alone
is insufficient to operate the computer. The CPU understands only object
code. 38 Although a programmer theoretically could write a program in object
code, the existence of compiler programs that translate source code into ob-
ject code obviates such an endeavor. 39 Compiler programs, otherwise known
as compilers, accept source code as input and, after several intermediate
steps, produce object code as output. 0
Although the advent of computer technology represents a relatively re-
cent occurrence in the history of the copyright laws, several Supreme Court
copyright cases decided prior to the invention of computers still affect the ap-
plicability of copyright to computer software.4 Baker v. Selden42 expresses
the fundamental tenet that copyright protects the expression of an idea but
not the idea itself. 3 In Baker, the plaintiff's testator owned a copyright on a
book that described a bookkeeping system." The book contained blank
forms designed for use with the described system.4 The defendant published
a book that described the same system and included forms that fulfilled the
same purposes as the forms in the plaintiff's book." The Supreme Court held
37. See Hamacher, Vranesic, & Zaky, supra note 32, at 8-3 (source program is any pro-
gram written in higher level language than machine language); A. KHAMBATA, supra note 15, at
366 (programs written in BASIC, FORTRAN, and COBOL are source code programs).
38. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (CPU understands only digital electric pulses
of binary information).
39. See K. SHORT, supra note 15, at 150 (computers convert source code program into ob-
ject code).
40. See Hamacher, Vranesic, & Zaky, supra note 32, at 8-3 (output of compiler is object
code). Object code is the presence or absence of electrical pulses that open and close the binary
logic gates of the CPU. K. SHORT, supra note 15, at 146.
41. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir.
1983) (Baker v. Selden and Mazer v. Stein still control application of copyright law), cert. dis-
missed, 104 S.Ct. 690 (1984); infra notes 42-70 and accompanying text (Supreme Court precedent
affects copyright law despite reenactment of copyright acts); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 218 (1954) (copyright may protect works of authorship that have utilitarian functions);
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101 (1879) (copyright protects expression of idea but not idea
itself).
42. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
43. See id. at 101-02 (each author has right to express common knowledge in own way); see
also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (copyright protects expression of idea but not idea
itself); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.) (axiomatic that
copyright protection extends only to particular expression of idea but never to idea itself), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 740
(9th Cir. 1971) (copyright protects only expression of idea unlike patent which protects idea);
Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182, 183-84 (7th Cir. 1944) (disclosed information
is within public domain); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926) (copyright protects
means of expressing idea).
44. 101 U.S. at 100.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 101.
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that use of the blank forms did not infringe upon the plaintiff's copyright.4 7
The Court reasoned that the plaintiff's copyright on the book did not give the
plaintiff the right to control the use of the bookkeeping system that the book
described. 48 The Baker doctrine stands for the proposition that use of an idea,
method, system, or process does not infringe a copyright in an expression of
the same.
49
In Mazer v. Stein," the Supreme Court expanded the Baker doctrine by
holding that copyright may protect a work even though the work has
utilitarian functions.II The Mazer plaintiff produced and claimed copyright in
statuettes designed for use as bases for table lamps.52 The defendant copied
the plaintiff's statuettes and sold the statuettes as lamp bases. 3 The Court
held that the use of a copyrighted work in a utilitarian object is not inconsis-
tent with copyright.54 The Mazer Court reasoned that nothing in the copyright
law prohibited extension of copyright to a work of authorship simply because
the author used the work in industry." The Court noted, however, that
copyright protects only the artistic expression and form in a work but not the
mechanical or utilitarian aspects of the work.5 6 The principles that the
Supreme Court expressed in Baker and Mazer are crucial cobblestones that
have paved the way for copyright protection of computer programs, which,
like the ledger in Baker and the lamp base in Mazer, contain utilitarian
aspects.1
7
47. Id. at 107.
48. Id. at 103.
49. M. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[D], at 2-207 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
NIMMER].
50. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
51. Id. at 218.
52. Id. at 202.
53. Id. at 203.
54. Id. at 217-18.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 218.
57. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., No. 83-5875, slip op. at 697, 699 (9th
Cir. Feb. 8, 1984) (Baker doctrine prohibits monopolization of idea when limited number of
ways to express idea exist); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1252 (3d Cir. 1983) (Baker and Mazer remain benchmarks of copyright law for proposition that
use of copyrighted work in utilitarian object is not inconsistent with copyright), cert. dismissed,
104 S.Ct. 690 (1984).
Like Baker and Mazer, the Supreme Court's decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co.
v. Apollo Co. has affected the copyrightability of computer software. See White-Smith Music
Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). In White-Smith, the plaintiff published several songs in
the form of sheet music. Id. at 8. The defendant, a manufacturer of automated pianos, produced
perforated piano rolls that caused the defendant's pianos to play the plaintiff's melodies. Id. at
9. The Supreme Court held that the production of perforated piano rolls did not infringe the
plaintiff's copyright in the sheet music. Id. at 18. The Court stated that copying occurred only
when people could see and read the result work. Id. at 17. Since the perforated piano rolls were
unreadable, the rolls did not constitute copies of the original work. Id. at 18. The White-Smith
Court reasoned that since the perforated rolls were parts of a machine, they were not copies
within the meaning of the copyright act. Id. Since object code stored on floppy disk or cassette
19841 1369
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1361
In response to the rapid growth of technology that characterized the first
half of the twentieth century, Congress sought in 1964 to revamp federal
copyright law.50 Congress took no action on the general revision until 1976,
but in 1974 established the National Commission on New Technological Uses
of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) to study the impact of computers on the use
of copyrighted materials. 9 Without awaiting the completion of CONTU's
studies, Congress enacted the 1976 Act.6" The 1976 Act codified the Baker
doctrine by expressly denying copyright protection to ideas, procedures, pro-
cesses, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles, and
discoveries. 6' The 1976 Act's legislative history indicates that Congress in-
tended to maintain the traditional dichotomy between ideas and expressions. 62
tape is unreadable without the aid of a computer, the White-Smith doctrine, if applicable, would
prevent effective application of copyright to computer software. See Data Cash Systems, Inc. v.
JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1068-69 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (White-Smith precludes copy-
right protection for information in ROM since person cannot see or read information with naked
eye), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing
Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1011 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (material must undertake to express to obtain
copyright protection).
58. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5660. The technologies that emerged and developed during the first
half of the twentieth century include radio, television, video and audio recording, satellite, laser,
and information technologies. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5660.
In 1971, Congress issued emergency legislation to provide limited protection for sound re-
cordings. See Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). Congress enacted the 1971 sound record-
ing legislation in response to pressure from the sound recording industry, which was suffering
significant financial loss at the hands of tape and record pirates. See Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 562-63 n.17 (1973). Since the 1971 legislation protected works fixed on magnetic tapes
and plastic disks, which a human cannot read, the legislation effectively overruled White-Smith,
at least in regard to sound recordings. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (1971 con-
gressional action effectively reversed White-Smith).
59. Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974). In 1974, Congress established the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) as a department of
the Library of Congress. Id. § 201(a). Congress charged CONTU with the responsibility of study-
ing and compiling data on the use of copyrighted works in conjunction with automated informa-
tion systems and print production systems. Id. § 201(b). Congregs further charged CONTU with
the responsibility of recommending changes in copyright law. Id. § 201(c). CONTU consisted of
twelve presidential appointees and the Librarian of Congress. Id. § 202.
60. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. (1982));
see supra note I (discussing major aspects of 1976 Act).
61. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
62. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5660. The legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that Congress
did not intend section 102(b) of the 1976 Act to enlarge or contract the scope of copyright protec-
tion that existed under the 1909 Act. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670. According to the legislative history
of the 1976 Act, § 102(b) merely restated then-current understanding of the dichotomy between
idea and expression. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5670; see supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text (use of an
idea does not infringe copyright on work that expresses same idea).
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The legislative history, however, also indicates that Congress intended to pro-
vide that an author may fix a copyrighted work in a tangible medium of ex-
pression now known or later developed.3 Since CONTU had not completed
its studies, the 1976 Act froze the status quo pending final report of
CONTU.64
CONTU issued its final report in 1978, recognizing the reaffirming the
principles that the Supreme Court enunciated in Baker and that Congress
codified in the 1976 Act.6 5 The CONTU final report stated that only the ex-
pression that a programmer adopts is copyrightable and that copyright does
not protect the proceses or methods that a programmer employs.6 6 CONTU
emphasized that, although copyright should not protect the electromechanical
functioning of a computer, the mere fact that computer programs operate
machinery should not affect their copyrightability.67 The CONTU report
compared computer programs to vidotapes and phonorecords, both of which
operate machinery yet are still copyrightable. 8 The majority of the CONTU
members recommended that Congress explicitly extend copyright protection
to computer programs. 69 In 1980, Congress amended the 1976 Act, incor-
63. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5665. The legislative history of the 1976 Act states that the form, man-
ner and medium of fixation is irrelevant for determining copyright protection under the 1976
Act, provided that the work is fixed in a stable medium from which a person using a machine or
other device may perceive the work. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659g5665. The legislative history specifies that
any graphic or lnmbolic idea embodied in a physical object satisfies the fixation requirement.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD.
NEWs 5659, 5665.
64. See Pub. L. No. 94-553 § 117, 90 Stat. 2565 (1976), repealed, Pub. L. No. 96-517 §
10(b), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980).
65. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 18-20 (expression that programmer
adopts is copyrightable element of computer program).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 21-22.
68. Id. at 20.
69. Id. at 1-2. The CONTU majority recommended that Congress should amend the 1976
Act explicitly to provide that computer programs are the proper subject of copyright, to apply to
all uses of copyrighted materials in computers, and to ensure that rightful owners of proprietary
software may use or adapt their copies for use Id. at 1. The CONTU majority also recom-
mended that Congress review the economic effects of the copyright acts on a periodic basis. Id.
at 2.
The CONTU dissent vigorously discouraged the adoption of the majority's recommenda-
tions on several grounds. Id. at 27 (Commissioner Hersey, dissenting). The dissent asserted that a
computer program in its object code form does not constitute a writing within the meaning of the
Constitution. Id. at 27-28; see U.S. CONST., Art. I, see. 8, cl. 8 (Congress may grant author
limited monopoly on author's writings). The CONTU dissent also stated that although source
code programs clearly satisfied the writings requirement, object code programs actually control
the electrical impulses of the computer and, therefore, merge with the machinery. CONTU FINAL
REPORT, supra note 7, at 28 (Commissioner Hersey, dissenting). The dissent asserted that the
essence of copyright is the protection of communications between people and that the absence of
a human audience should preclude copyright. Id. at 29-30. The dissent further asserted that ex-
tension of copyright to computer programs would result in the concentration of economic power
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porating CONTU's recommendations without material change.7
The extension of copyright protection to computer programs has made
copyright law the central legal factor in defining the competitive relationships
between vendors of hardware and software. 71 The recent Third Circuit deci-
sion in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.," exemplifies the
commercial conflict that currently exists in the microcomputer marketplace.
73
Apple Computer (Apple) established the microcomputer market in 1976 by
introducing the Apple-Il personal computer (Apple-II)7 ' Each Apple-II in-
in large corporate computer manufacturing concerns rather than the protection of communica-
tions. Id. at 34-37. The dissent, thus, recommended that Congress amend the 1976 Act to specify
that copyright does not extend to computer programs in the form in which they are capable of
controlling computer operations. Id. at 37.
The CONTU concurrence shared several of the dissent's doubts over the propriety of ex-
tending copyright protection to computer programs. Id. at 26-27 (Commissioner Nimmer, con-
curring). The concurrence criticized the majority for failing to articulate any rationale that would
justify limiting copyright protection to computer software. Id. at 26. The concurrence character-
ized the majority's recommendations as a general misappropriation law, applicable to all tangible
expressions of original ideas. Id. As did the dissent, the concurrence considered extension of
copyright to computer programs a substantial strain on the Constitution's use of the terms
"author" and "writing." Id. The concurrence, however, supported the majority's recommenda-
tions and suggested a possible future line of demarcation between copyrightable and uncopy-
rightable computer programs. Id. at 27. The concurrence urged Congress to re-examine copyright
in the future and, if the majority's recommendations prove to be unduly restrictive, to grant
copyright protection only to those programs that result in communication to human beings. Id.
70. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3029 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)).
71. See Object Code, supra note 10, at 1723-24 (copyright protects against misappropria-
tion of computer programs).
72. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
73. See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 871 (3d Cir. 1982)
(defendant copied plaintiff's program for DEFENDER video game); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kauf-
man, 669 F.2d 852, 853 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant copied program for SCRAMBLE coin-oper-
ated video game); Hubco Data Prods. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 1983 COPYRIGHT L. REP.
25,529 at 18,101 (D. Idaho 1983) (defendant copied plaintiff's operating system to upgrade and
sell copies); Tandy v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(defendant copied plaintiff's input-output routine designed for use in Radio Shack TRS-80 per-
sonal computer); Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065-66
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (defendant copied plaintiff's computer program for chess game), aff'd, 628 F.2d
1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
74. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 776 (C.D. Cal. 1983),
aff'd, No. 83-5875, slip op. at 696 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984). In Formula, the defendant copied five
of Apple's operating system programs for distribution with the defendant's Pineapple Computer.
Id. at 776-77. Apple sued for copyright infringement and moved to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion. Id. at 777-78. The district court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, reasoning
that operating systems programs are copyrightable and that Apple had demonstrated substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 779-84. The Formula court noted that the facts in For-
mula were nearly identical to the facts in Franklin. Id. at 784. The Third Circuit's review of the
Franklin case represents the first appellate review of either case. The Ninth Circuit recently af-
firmed the district court's decision in Formula. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.,
No. 83-5875, slip op. at 696 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984) (district court properly issued preliminary in-
junction to prevent Formual from infringing Apple's copyrights).
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cludes a software package that facilitates the use of the computer." Apple has
nurtured the growth of its hardware sales by developing a large library of ap-
plications programs 76 that run on the Apple-Il." The huge library of Apple-
compatible applications programs written by independent computer program-
mers, however, dwarfs the number of programs that Apple itself distributes. 74
An independent developer of applications software must design programs
with more in mind than just the hardware specifictions of the Apple-IL. Ap-
plications programs must accommodate aspects of Apple's operating system
software to achieve compatibility. 79 Accordingly, Apple and the independent
programmers have developed a symbiotic relationship. The existence of a
large library of software increases the Apple-II's marketability and the large
number of Apple-Il computers in use increases the potential market for in-
dependently developed software.80
75. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1244 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 690 (1984). Apple Computer, Inc. (Apple) provides each
purchaser of an Apple-II microcomputer with all of the software necessary to operate the com-
puter. Id. For instance, Apple provides Apple-Il users with Copy, a program that enables a user
to copy programs from one floppy diskette to another. Id. Apple also provides Master Create,
Hello, and Autostart-ROM, programs which prepare the computer for use each time someone
uses the computer. Id. Together, these programs along with several others comprise the Apple-Il
operating system. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 815
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (programs constitute operating system), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 690 (1984). The majority of the Apple-II operating system programs
reside on floppy disks. Id. The Autostart-ROM program resides in ROM. 714 F.2d at 1244 n.4;
see infra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing function of bootstart programs).
76. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (application program performs specific
tasks).
77. See 714 F.2d at 1242 (Apple distributes more than 150 applications programs).
78. See Brief for Appellee at 6, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (independent programmers have developed thousands of applications
programs for Apple-II), cert. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 690 (1984).
79. 714 F.2d at 1244 n.4. The terms "format" and "compatability" refers to the standard
specifications that a given program or piece of computer equipment must meet to interface or
mesh with another program or piece of equipment. Meek, Compatibility, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPUTER SCIENCE 236-37 (A. Ralston & C. Meek eds. 1976). Microcomputer operating systems
provide the crucial interface between an application program and a computer. See Rubin &
Strehlo, Why So Many Computers Look Like the "IBM Standard," in PERSONAL COMPUTING,
March 1984, 52, 59 (operating system acts as middle man handling interactions between applica-
tion program and computer). The aspects of an operating system that interact with a particular
computer may be tailored to operate the particular hardware. Id. The portion of the operating
system that interacts with applications programs, however, must meet the specifications that con-
stitute a particular format to achieve compatibility with applications software designed for the
format. See id. (standardized operating system allows software to run on variety of computer
systems). Standardization encourages the independent production of applications software by ex-
panding the potential market for a given application program that complies with the standard.
Id. at 56.
80. See Stern, "Idea" Swallows "Expression" or a Left Handed Way to Say That Second
Comers Should Build Their Own Highways to the Market, 2 COMPUTER L. REP. 380, 380 (1983)
(hardware manufacturer may control availability of operating system software in attempt to con-
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Franklin Computer Corporation (Franklin) products the ACE-100
microcomputer, which functions similarly to the Apple-II. At the time of the
district court hearing in Franklin, Franklin had sold fewer than 1,000
ACE-100 computers." In designing the ACE-100, Franklin decided to adopt
the format8 2 of the Apple-Il to capitalize on the existing market for Apple-
compatible products. 3 Franklin officials determined that to compete suc-
cessfully with Apple, one hundred percent compatibility was necessary. 4
Franklin also determined that writing its own Apple-compatible operating
system was technologically infeasible and, therefore, copied fourteen of
Apple's operating system programs, including several bootstart programs
stored in ROM.85 Although Franklin openly admitted copying Apple's soft-
trol market). Apple's annual sales of $335 million and total unit sales of more than 400,000
Apple-Ius attest to the success of Apple's marketing strategy. 714 F.2d at 1242.
81. 714 F.2d at 1243. Although Franklin sought to design a personal computer that was
compatible with the Apple-II, Franklin claimed that the ACE-100 computer was superior to the
Apple-II in several respects. Brief for Appellee at 9 n.3, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Compu-
ter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 690 (1984). Franklin claimed that
the ACE-100 had a larger memory and a better keyboard than the Apple-If, as well as upper and
lower case capability, which the Apple-II lacked. Id.
82. See supra note 79 (format refers to interface standards).
83. 714 F.2d at 1243.
84. Id. at 1245.
85. Id. In Franklin, the operating systems programs that Franklin copied resided both in
ROM and on floppy disks. Id. at 1244 n.4. The ROM-based programs consisted of Autostart-
ROM, Applesoft, Apple 13-Sector Boot ROM, and Apple 16-Sector Boot ROM. Id.; see supra
note 75 (discussing Apple operating systems programs). The Applesoft program is a BASIC in-
terpreter which, like a compiler, translates high-level BASIC source code into machine-readable
object code. 714 F.2d at 1244 n.4; see supra notes 32-40 and accommpanying text (compilers
translate source code into machine-readable object code). The remaining ROM-based programs
are bootstart programs which enable the computer to begin operation and accept further instruc-
tions. W. Schmidt, Legal Proprietary Interests in Computer Programs: The American Experi-
ence, 21 JURIMETRICS 345, 350-51 (1981); see 714 F.2d at 1244 n.4 (ROM-based programs enable
computer to run other programs).
In early minicomputers, a human operator manually loaded a computer's initial instruc-
tions into the computer's memory each time the operator activated the system. D. Bateron,
Loader, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 804 (A. Ralston & C. Meek eds. 1976). The ini-
tial instructions enabled the computer to load more sophisticated operating systems programs
automatically from tape or disk storage devices. Id. at 806-08. To load the initial instruction set,
the computer operator had to depress a series of front-panel switches in a predefined pattern and
enter the pattern by pressing an "Enter" or "Deposit" button. See R. ECKHOUSE, JR., supra
note 33, at 167-70 (describing bootstrap procedure for DEC PDP-11 series minicomputer). The
operator would reset the switch pattern and repeat this process from half a dozen to several
dozen times, depending on the number of initial instructions that the given computer required.
See id. Once the operator had entered the instructions correctly, the computer could begin to
run. See id. at 317 (operator begins execution of bootstrap program by pressing "start" button);
see also id. at 315 (photograph of operator's console). The name for this process, bootstrapping,
or bootstarting, or booting the computer refers to the impossible feat of lifting oneself by one's
own bootstraps. Halpern, Bootstrap, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 183-84 (A.
Ralston & C. Meek eds. 1976). The advent of ROM chips, which can store a program even when
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ware, Franklin assumed that the operating system constituted a purely
utilitarian process and thus was not copyrightable.
86
Apple sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, seeking to enjoin Franklin from infringing Apple's
copyrights.8 ' At the preliminary injunction hearing, Franklin contended that
copyright does not protect a computer program in its object code phase, an
object code program stored in ROM, or a computer operating system.8" The
district court, however, denied Apple's motion for a preliminary injunction
on the grounds that Apple had not shown a likelihood of success on the
merits. 9 The court doubted that copyrighted protected Apple's operating
system software, reasoning that the operating system constituted an unprotec-
tible idea rather than a copyrightable expression." Moreover, the district
court concluded that pending full trial on the merits, Apple could withstand
the possible injury of infringement better than Franklin could bear the effects
of a preliminary injunction. 9
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's denial of
Apple's motion for a preliminary injunction.92 The Franklin court held that
the district court erred by failing to recognize that copyright does not exclude
computer operating systems from protection.9 3 The Third Circuit also held
that copyright protects object code, even when the object code resides in
a computer's power fails, rendered the process of manual bootstrapping obsolete. See R.
ECKHOUSE, JR., supra note 33, at 167-70. Since modern microcomputers do not have front
panels, the bootstrap process depends entirely on progams stored in ROM. See 714 F.2d at 1244
n.4 (Autostart-ROM performs internal functions that ready computer for use); A. KHAMBATA,
supra note 15, at 372-73 (ROM-based bootstrap relieves operator of burden of manual entry of
initial instructions). The bootstart programs stored in ROM are not portable from one computer
to another, but rather are entirely dependent in design on the peculiarities of a given type of com-
puter system. Hamacher, Vranesic, & Zaky, supra note 32, at 8-5.
86. 714 F.2d at 1245.
87. Id. at 1244. In Franklin, Franklin responded to Apple's claim of copyright infringe-
ment by counterclaiming for a declaratory judgment that Apple's copyrights were invalid and un-
enforceable. Id. Franklin argued that the extension of copyright to Apple's operating system
would deprive non-Apple owners of the ability to take advantage of the vast body of independ-
ently written Apple-compatible applications programs. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
Franklin defended its own conduct, reasoning that Franklin had not manufactured an Apple-
compatible system but rather a system that was compatible with the large body of Apple-
compatible software. Id.; see infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (Franklin asserted that
Apple programs were ineligible for copyright).
88. 545 F. Supp. at 817.
89. Id. at 812.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 825; see infra note 135 and accompanying text (Franklin court held that pre-
sumption of irreparable harm arises when copyrighted material is central to essence of plaintiff's
operations and plaintiff shows substantial likelihood of success on merits).
92. 714 F.2d at 1242.
93. Id. at 1253-54.
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ROM. 94 Because Apple had invested substantial amounts of capital in the
development of its operating system, the Franklin court determined that the
existence of Apple's substantial economic investment warranted a presump-
tion of irreparable injury.9 The Franklin court, therefore, reversed and
remanded the case.
6
Although the distinction between source code and object code presents an
intellectual hurdle in characterizing object code programs as original works of
authorship, the Franklin court held that object code is a proper subject for
copyright protection." The court found support for its position in the 1980
amendment to the 1976 Act which defined computer programs as a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer. 91
The Third Circuit reasoned that since a computer understands only object
code and not source code, only object code can act directly in a computer. 9
The Franklin court declared that the statutory use of the term "directly,"
therefore, inmplies that Congress intended to protect object code.' The
court also relied on the CONTU majority's definition of an object code pro-
gram as a conversion or translation of the source code program for the pro-
position that an object code program is the same work of authorship as the
corresponding source code program.' The Franklin court noted that even
the CONTU dissent, which advocated denial of copyright to all computer
programs, acknowledged that an object code program is a phase of the same
work of authorship that yields the associated source code program.
0 2
The Third Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning that a program in
object code is not copyrightable since a person cannot perceive the work. 03
94. Id. at 1246-49.
95. Id. at 1254-55.
96. Id. at 1242.
97. Id. at 1246-49; see supra notes 32-40 (compiler rewrites source code to create object
code); supra note 69 and accompanying text (CONTU Commissioner Hersey disputed majority's
assertion that object code program constitutes original work of authorship).
98. 714 F.2d at 1247-48; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (computer program is set of statements
or instructions to be used directly in computer in order to bring about certain result).
99. 714 F.2d at 1248.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 21 (object code is phase of source
code program).
102. 714 F.2d at 1248; see CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 28 (Commissioner
Hersey, dissenting) (object code program constitutes final phase of programming process); supra
note 69 (Commissioner Hersey recommended denial of copyright to computer programs).
103. 714 F.2d at 1248. The district court's theory in Franklin that copyright protects only
readable computer programs closely resembled Professor Nimmer's suggestions in his CONTU
concurrence. Compare 545 F. Supp. at 821 (copyright protects humanly-readable works) with
CONTU FINAL REPORT, (Nimmer, concurring), supra note 7, at 27 (copyright should protect
only those computer programs that have expressive purpose). The CONTU majority, however,
expressly rejected Professor Nimmer's approach, reasoning that such an approach would pre-
clude from copyright many useful programs such as programs that regulate traffic flow during
rush hours or programs that monitor the vital signs of patients in intensive care units. CONTU




The Franklin court stated that the district court's reasoning stemmed from an
earlier Supreme Court case that Congress expressly overruled in the 1976
Act.0 4 The Franklin court emphasized that the 1976 Act permits an author to
fix a work in any medium from which a person can perceive the work with the
aid of a machine or device such as a computer." 5 The Third Circuit,
therefore, held that a computer program in object code is copyrightable
regardless of the need to use a computer to perceive or reproduce the work.1
0 6
The Third Circuit in Franklin briefly discussed the question of whether
copyright protects ROM-based object code since, shortly after the Franklin
district court issued its opinion, the Third Circuit decided the same issue in
Williams v. Artic International, Inc.17 In Williams, the defendant had copied
the plaintiff's ROM-based video game computer programs. 08 The Third Cir-
cuit rejected the defendant's argument that copyright does not protect ROMs
because ROMs are machine parts.'0 9 The Williams court held that a copyright
protects object code programs stored in ROM." I0 The court stated that copy-
right does not protect the design of the ROM itself but only the information
stored in the ROM chip.' " The Williams court reasoned that the 1976 Act en-
compassed the fixation of copyrightable works in technologically advanced
media such as ROMs."II In Franklin, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the analysis
employed in Williams regarding the copyrightability of object code programs
stored in ROM.
' 3
Although prior cases had established the copyrightability of object code
even when stored in ROM, " ' the question of copyrightability of computer
operating systems presented the Franklin court with an issue of first impres-
sion at the appellate level.' Franklin asserted that the fourteen operating
systems programs that Franklin copied constituted systems, processes, or
104. 714 F.2d at 1248; see White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1908) (unreadable piano rolls did not constitute copies of copyrighted music); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1982) (copyright subsists in original work of authorship fixed in tangible medium of expression
perceptible with aid of machine or device); supra note 57 (discussing White-Smith); supra notes
58-64 and accompanying text (Congress overruled White-Smith in 1976 Act).
105. 714 F.2d at 1248.
106. Id. at 1248-49.
107. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); see 714 F.2d at 1249 (Williams court held that ROM-based
object code meets fixation requirement).
108. 685 F.2d at 871.
109. Id. at 874.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 877.
112. Id. at 875 n.5.
113. 714 F.2d at 1249.
114. See supra notes 25-31 (ROMs provide long-term storage of information and instruc-
tions).
115. See 714 F.2d at 1250 (question of copyrightability of operating system constitutes issue
of first impression); Raysman & Brown, Major Computer Software Issues Resolved in Program-
ming Ruling, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1983 at 50 (Franklin resolves confusion regarding scope of
copyright for computer programs).
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methods of operation, and therefore were ineligible for copyright protec-
tion. 16 Franklin also asserted that the programs represented the only means
of expressing the idea underlying the programs and that Apple had no right to
monopolize the idea.' Franklin contended that Apple's operating system
format constituted an element of the underlying idea of an Apple-II operating
system and was not merely a form of expression.''I
The Third Circuit rejected Franklin's contention that an operating system
constitutes an unprotectible system, process, or method of operation." 9 The
court reasoned that no meaningful distinction exists between applications pro-
grams and operating systems programs since both applications and operating
systems programs control the functions of a computer.' 20 The Franklin court
noted that CONTU similarly had refused to distinguish between computer
programs on the basis of a program's intended use."' Moreover, the Third
Circuit rejected Franklin's claim that the Baker doctrine stands for the pro-
position that utilitarian articles are not copyrightable.' 22 The Franklin court
stated that the Supreme Court's later decision in Mazer clarified any potential
ambiguities in the Baker decision by rejecting the proposition that utilitarian
devices are ineligible for copyright protection. 23 The Third Circuit noted that
116. 714 F.2d at 1250; see Brief for Appellee at 13-16, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), reprinted in I COMPUTER L. REP. 681, 691-93
(1983). Franklin argued on appeal that Apple's operating systems programs constituted pro-
cesses, systems, or methods of operation, which § 102(b) of the 1976 Act precluded from copy-
right. Id. at 13, reprinted in I COMPUTER L. REP. at 691. Franklin emphasized that Apple's own
witnesses at the preliminary injunction hearing characterized Apple's programs as a system and
concept that related to the operation of the computer itself. Id. at 15-16, reprinted in I CONi-
PUTER L. REP. at 692-93. The Third Circuit refused to attach significance to the phraseology that
the witnesses used since the witnesses were not lawyers and did not use the phrases in a legal
sense. 714 F.2d at 1250 n.8.
Franklin further asserted that the Baker decision precluded Apple from asserting copyright
in programs that are necessary incidents to the use of a machine. Brief for Appellee at 25, Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), reprinted in 1
COMPUTER L. REP. at 681, 697-98 (1983); see supra notes 41-57 and accompanying text (Mazer
expanded Baker by holding that copyright may protect work that has utilitarian functions). An
amicus curiae, Pro-Log Corporation, argued in support of Franklin's contention that copyright
should not permit a hardware manufacturer to establish a legal monopoly over computer hard-
ware. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Pro-Log Corporation, at 2, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), reprinted in 1 COMPUTER L. REP. at 872, 876
(1983) (Congress did not intend that copyright foster 75-year monopolies for machines). Pro-
Log, therefore, specifically objected to the extension of copyright to operating systems programs
based in ROM. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1 COMPUTER L. REP. at 880.
117. 714 F.2d at 1251.
118. Id. at 1252-53.
119. Id. at 1252.
120. Id. at 1251-52.
121. Id.; see CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 21 (fact that computer programs
ultimately implement processes should not affect copyrightability of programs).
122. 714 F.2d at 1251-52.
123. Id. at 1252; see supra notes 41-57 and accompanying text (Mazer expanded Baker by
holding that copyright may protect work that has utilitarian functions).
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if operating systems software were ineligible for copyright because of the
operating system's utilitarian nature, then all software would be ineligible for
the same reason. 24 The Franklin court held that since Congress intended
broad protection for computer programs, operating systems are eligible for
copyright protection.'2
The Third Circuit rejected Franklin's assertion that the merger of Apple's
expression and idea barred a finding of infringement.' 26 The Franklin court
recognized that articulating where the line falls between idea and expression is
a difficult task.'" The court noted that maintenance of the balance between
124. 714 F.2d at 1252.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1253. Although the Franklin court's holding that the idea underlying Apple's
operating system programs had not merged with Apple's expression of the idea represents an im-
portant delineation of the rights of software competitors, the court's opinion on the merger issue
constitutes dictum. See 714 F.2d 1253 (competitive and economic goals are irrelevant to deter-
mination of dividing point between idea and expression). Franklin openly admitted copying the
programs. Id. at 1245. The district court found that Frankin's copies contained the secretly
embedded name of the Apple programmer who had authored several of Apple's operating system
programs. Id. The majority of courts that have considered the issue hold that direct evidence of
verbatim copying is actionable even if the idea and expression have merged. See Atari, Inc. v.
North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.) (copyright will protect
only against identical copying if idea and expression are indistinguishable), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
880 (1982); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1168 (9th Cir. 1977) (copyright will prohibit only identical copying when idea and expression co-
incide); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 436 F.2d 315, 316-17 (2d Cir. 1970)
(copying jeweled bee pin from rubber mold constituted copyright infringement); see also Knowles
& Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN FERNANDO
VALLEY L. REV. 109, 139 n.108 (1980) (exact duplication may infringe even most minute quan-
tum of expression). But see Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir.
1944) (no infringement can occur when idea and expression have merged).
A comparison of Grossbardt and Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian illustrates
the proposition that direct evidence of copying precludes consideration of whether idea and ex-
pression have merged. Compare Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 436 F.2d 315,
316-17 (2d Cir. 197D0) (defendant produced exact copy of plaintiff's jeweled bee pin) with Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 739 (9th Cir. 1971) (defendant produced
jeweled bee pin that was similar to plaintiff's jeweled bee pin). The Grossbardt court held that
the exact duplication constituted copyright infringement. 436 F.2d at 316-17. In Kalpakian,
however, the defendant did not duplicate the plaintiff's bee from a rubber mold, but went
through the process of crafting a similar jeweled bee pin himself. 446 F.2d at 739. The Kalpakian
court held that the defendant had not infringed plaintiff's copyright, reasoning that the defen-
dant copied only the idea of a bee and not plaintiff's form of expression. Id. at 742.
Regardless of whether verbatim copying is actionable when idea and expression have merged,
the district court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc. expressly held that a
microcomputer hardware or software developer could reproduce the functioning aspects of
Apple's system without infringing Apple's copyrights. 569 F. Supp. 775, 782 (C.D. Cal. 1983),
aff'd. No. 83-5875, slip op. at 696 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1984). Since the existence of multiple forms
of expression of an idea precludes a finding of merger of idea and expression, the Franklin
court's discussion of idea and expression constitutes dictum.
127. 714 F.2d at 1253. Many courts have confronted the difficult task of determining where
to draw the line between idea and expression. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Con-
sumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir.) (no litmus paper test exists to distinguish idea
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competition and protection of originality is important in determining whether
a particular aspect of a program is a copyrightable expression or an unpro-
tectible idea. 28 The Third Circuit rejected Franklin's contention that the for-
mat of the Apple-II constitutes an element of the underlying idea of an Apple
operating system.12 9 The Franklin court defined the idea of an Apple
operating system at a very basic level. 3 ' To illustrate its perspective on the
nature of an operating system, the court cited as an example that the underly-
ing idea of a compiler is to translate source code into object code.'31 The
Franklin court held that Apple's operating system format is a characteristic of
Apple's expression of an operating system.'32 The court reasoned that
Franklin's commercial and competitive goal of compatibility is irrelevant to
the metaphysical determination of whether ideas and expressions have
merged.' 33 The court noted that if Franklin could have written programs that
performed the desired functions, then Franklin's copying would constitute
copyright infringement.' 34 Since the district court made no finding regarding
whether Apple's programs constituted the only means of expressing the
underlying ideas, the Third Circuit remanded the case for a factual determina-
tion of this issue.'
3
from expression), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630
F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980) (legal principles are of limited value in particular cases since merger
of idea and expression turns on facts); Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182, 184
(7th Cir. 1944) (difficult to distinguish between that which is taught and idea disclosed thereby).
Case law is particularly unhelpful in determining the dividing point between idea and expression
in computer programs, since the existing case law centers on works of music, art, and literature,
which are substantially different from computer programs. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips
Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant's K. C. MUNCHKIN video
game infringed expression of plaintiff's PAC-MAN video game); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy
Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980) (mechanical and structural similarity between plaintiff's
"Pass the Nuts" game and defendant's "Mickey Mouse Peanut Putter" game did not infringe
plaintiff's artistic expression); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978-79 (2d
Cir.) (plaintiff's theory as to cause of Hindenburg explosion constituted unprotectible idea), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant's McDonald's Land characters infringed plain-
tiff's copyright in H. R. Pufnstuf characters); see also Grogan & Kump, 'Apple' Enhances Com-
puter Software Protection, Legal Times, Feb. 13, 1984 at 18, 19 (prior cases dealing with
literature and art are inapposite to copyrightability of computer programs).







135. Id. at 1253-54. In addition to reversing the district court's interpretation of copyright
law, the Third Circuit in Franklin reversed the district court's choice of standard for determining
the existence of irreparable harm, a prerequisite to the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Id.
at 1255. The Third Circuit noted that the district court had applied an inverse relationship ap-
proach in which the required showing of irreparable harm varies inversely with the plaintiff's
showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 1254; see Kontes Glass Co. v. Lab Glass,
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The policy consideration that copyright seeks to encourage creativity and
originality supports the Franklin court's extension of copyright to object code
programs stored in ROM. 36 Common sense indicates that limiting copyright
protection to source code would provide an unlimited loophole for software
pirates.' 37 Since software vendors frequently distribute only the object code
version of a program to customers, software pirates could purchase a single
copy and legally duplicate the program at a negligible cost if copyright did not
protect the object code version. 3 Denial of copyright protection to object
code programs, therefore, would render the protection of source code mean-
ingless. 39 The majority of courts that have considered the copyrightability of
object code similarly have extended copyright protection to the object code.'
40
Inc., 373 F.2d 319, 320-31 (3d Cir. 1967) (degree of irreparable harm needed to issue preliminary
injunction is inversely related to likelihood of success on merits). Although the Franklin court's
treatment of the substantive copyright issues suggests that on remand Apple would have a high
likelihood of success on the merits, the court did not base its reversal of the injunction issue on
these grounds. 714 F.2d at 1254. Tfte Third Circuif instead rejected the inverse relationship ap-
proach and held that when the copyrighted material is central to the essence of the plaintiff's
operations, a prima facie case of copyright infringement or a showing of substantial likelihood of
success on the merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm. Id. The court noted that although
the inverse realtionship approach prQvi:les flexibility in applying equitable remedies when the ac-
tual injury is minimal, limited, or conjectural, application of the inverse relation approach to
cases in which the plaintiff has shown substantial economic investment would undermine the
copyright law's policy of encouraging creativity. Id.
Prior to any further action by the district court, Apple and Franklin settled their dispute.
See Rinkerman & Cohen, Apple and Franklin Settle, 2 COMPUTER L. REP. 553, 553 (1984).
Franklin agreed to pay Apple $2.5 million in damages and to cease selling computer systems con-
taining Apple's software by April 1, 1984. Id. Counsel for Franklin remarked that by April 1,
1984, Franklin will have sold approximately 100,000 computers containing Apple software. Id. at
554.
136. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text (case law and common sense support ex-
tension of copyright to ROM-based programs).
137. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982) (denial of
copyright protection to object code version of program would create unlimited loophole in
copyright protection); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 751 (N.D. II1. 1983) (pro-
tection of source code version of program without protection of object code version would con-
stitute pyrrhic victory for copyright owner).
138. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 751 (N.D. IIl. 1983) (vendors fre-
quently market object code versions of program on disk or tape).
139. See id. (no copyright protection would exist if unauthorized person could copy object
code freely).
140. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 871 (3d Cir. 1982) (defendant
copied plaintiff's object code program for DEFENDER video game); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kauf-
man, 669 F.2d 852, 853 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant copied object code program for SCRAMBLE
coin-operated video game); Hubco Data Prods. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 1983 CoPY-
RIGHT L. REP. 25,529 at 18,101 (D. Idaho 1983) (defendant copied plaintiff's operating system
to upgrade object code and sell copies); Tandy v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp.
171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (defendant copied plaintiff's object code input-output routine de-
signed for use in Radio Shack TRS-80 personal computer). But see Data Cash Systems, Inc. v.
JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065-66 (N.D. I11. 1979) (defendant's copying of plain-
tiff's ROM-based object code program for chess game did not infringe plaintiff's copyright),
aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
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In Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon,' 4' for example, the district
court for the Northern District of Illinois elaborated on the Williams decision
in a case also involving the copying of a ROM-based video game program."'
The Strohon court enjoined the defendant from selling copies of plaintiff's
program.'4 3 The court reasoned that a ROM is no more utilitarian than a
magnetic tape or disk since the purpose of both ROMs and magnetic tape
media is to store information that directs the operation of a computer.'" The
Strohon court also recognized that granting protection to object code pro-
grams residing on disks or tapes but not to programs in ROM would provide
an incentive for computer system developers to adopt a less efficient tech-
nology to protect their intellectual property. ' Common sense, therefore,
supports the recent case law that extends copyright protection to object code
programs stored in ROM.' 6
Although the Franklin court correctly recognized that CONTU did not
distinguish between operating systems software and applications software, the
court erred by extending copyright to Apple's ROM-based bootstart pro-
gram. 47 A bootstart program based in ROM enables the computer to load the
remainder of the operating system from a floppy disk into the computer's
memory.' Without the bootstart program or an equivalent program stored
in ROM, the Apple-II computer would be useless for any purpose.'" While
an independent programmer supposedly could reproduce the function of any
operating system program and could store his program on a floppy disk,
without special equipment the normal independent programmer could not in-
stall his version in a ROM chip. 5 ° Even if an independent software developer
owned ROM programming equipment, the typical consumer does not pur-
chase microcomputer programs based in ROM. 5 ' Floppy disks and cassette
tapes comprise the media upon which vendors normally distribute and con-
sumers purchase a microcomputer program.' 52 If a consumer were to pur-
141. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. I11. 1983).
142. Id. at 749-52. In Strohon, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from infringing
plaintiff's copyright on PAC-MAN video game computer programs. Id. at 742. The defendant
asserted that computer programs stored in ROM were not the proper subject of copyright. Id. at
749.
143. Id. at 754.
144. Id. at 751.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See supra note 85 (describing bootstart programs); infra notes 148-49 (ROM-based
bootstart program is not work of authorship).
148. See 714 F.2d at 1244 n.4; supra note 85 (describing bootstart programs).
149. See 714 F.2d at 1244 n.4; supra note 85 (describing bootstart programs).
150. See K. SHORT, supra note 15, at 54-55. The development of a ROM-based program in-
volves photo-masking, etching, and diffusion, in addition to program design. Id. PROMs,
howeyer, are programmable after manufacture by the use of special programming equipment. Id.
at 60-61; see supra notes 12-27 and accompanying text (development of ROMs requires special
skill and equipment).
151. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 751 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (vendors




chase a ROM-based program, to install the new program the consumer would
have to invade the computer hardware, unplug the original chip, and replace
the old chip with the desired ROM.'53 Apple's decision to design a computer
that requires the presence of a ROM-based program, therefore, presents a
substantial impediment to the development and commercial exploitation of
competing microcomputer programs.'" Since CONTU noted that the absence
of significant barriers to entry into the program-writing market is a hallmark
of the computer software industry, the commercial impediments to distribu-
tion of ROM-based bootstart programs weigh against extension of copyright
protection.'
The Baker doctrine suggests that copyright does not extend to the design,
construction, or use of computer hardware.I r Moreover, the Mazer decision,
which permits the extension of copyright to works of authorship that an
author uses in conjunction with a utilitarian device, requires the physical or
conceptual separability of the work of authorship from utilitarian aspects of
the device. 57 Bootstart programs, however, conceptually and physically are
intertwined with and dependent upon the peculiarities of the hardware that
they operate." 8 The commercial impediments, the indispensable nature of a
ROM-based bootstart, and the physical and conceptual inseparability of a
bootstart progam from the computer it operates suggest that the bootstart
ROM shares fewer common attributes with computer programs than it shares
with computer hardware. 59 The ROM-based bootstart program, therefore, is
not a work of authorship eligible for copyright protection.'
60
Although no court has enunciated a concrete method for defining how to
distinguish an expression from its underlying idea, 6 ' several courts have rec-
ognized that the location of the line between idea and expression depends on a
153. See De Jong, HMS 3264 EPROM Programmer, in BYTE, June, 1983, at 288 (insertion
of ROMs requires removal of cover and poses risk of harm or breakage of equipment).
154. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text (storing program in ROM poses tech-
nical and financial impediment to marketing of program).
155. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 23 (ease of entry into software writing
market is hallmark of computer software industry). CONTU notes that new software firms could
enter the market with minimal capital investment. Id. To illustrate its point, CONTU explained
that Computer Sciences Corporation, a major software producer, enjoys annual sales in excess of
$100 million from an original investment of less than $1,000. Id.
156. See supra notes 41-57 and accompanying text (copyright protects expression but not
idea or system).
157. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (Mazer doctrine extends copyright to
works of authorship that are conceptually distinct from utilitarian objects).
158. See Schmidt, supra note 85, at 350-51 (bootstrap programs constitute minimum pro-
gramming necessary to operate computer and usually are not considered software).
159. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 751 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (ROM-based
programs share attributes of software when programs contain information beyond minimum
necessary to turn computer on).
160. See supra notes 147-59 (ROM is component of hardware).
161. See supra note 142 (articulating distinction between idea and expression is difficult
task); see also CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 18 (line between copyrightable programs
and uncopyrightable processes is not clear).
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case-by-case determination of how large an area of protection Congress in-
tended to reserve for a copyright owner. 62 In its final report to Congress,
CONTU emphasized that programmers should be free to make a computer
perform any conceivable process, provided that a programmer does not take
another's program.' 63 In defining format compatibility as a form of expres-
sion rather than as an underlying idea, however, the Franklin court ignored
the fact that strict adherence to a particular format is a fundamental consider-
ation for the author of any computer program. 16 An applications program-
mer must follow the format of the operating system on which the pro-
grammer wants his program to function.165 Since the Apple-II operating
system actually consists of fourteen interdependent programs, each program
must comply with the common Apple-II format. 6 6 Moreover, since new sales
of Apple computers depend on the availability of the existing body of Apple-
compatible applications programs, Apple must adhere to its own format
when publishing operating system modifications and upgrades for the Apple-
I1.167 The fundamental importance of an operating system's format, there-
fore, suggests that the Franklin court defined the idea of an operating system
too narrowly.
Contrary to the Third Circuit's opinion in Franklin, determination of
where to draw the line between an idea and an expression should not involve a
foray into metaphysical considerations. 161 In determining the scope of
copyright protection, courts should continue to examine the countervailing
policies of protection and encouragement of creativity and originality, on the
one hand, and free interchange and use of ideas on the other.' 69 Although
Congress clearly intended that copyright should provide broad protection for
computer software,' 70 Congress also established limitations on the scope of
162. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (determination of what constitutes expression is actually determination of
size of congressionally authorized monopoly); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian,
446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (determination of distinction between idea and expression
depends on determination of size of congressionally authorized monopoly).
163. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 20.
164. See Miastkowski, Microcomputer Operating Systems, in THE MCGRAW-HILL COM-
PUTER HANDBOOK, 28-3 (H. Helms, ed. 1983) (applications software developed on one system is
not transferable to another system).
165. Id.
166. See 714 F.2d at 1244 n.4 (Apple-II's operating system consists of fourteen interdepend-
ent programs).
167. See Miastkowski, supra note 177, at 28-4 (Apple has recognized that large body of ap-
plications software guarantees strong consumer demand for Apple hardware).
168. See 714 F.2d at 1253 (determination of whether idea and expression have merged is
metaphysical).
169. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain constitutes essence of economic philosophy of copyright clause of Constitution);
U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.




copyright protection. 7 ' The legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that
courts should consider the commercial and competitive goals of computer
software developers in determining the scope of copyright protection.,7 2 The
Franklin court, therefore, should have recognized that adherence to a par-
ticular format is an essential element of the idea of an operating system.
In deciding that microcomputer operating systems are eligible for copy-
right, the courts have reaffirmed the principle that all original works of
authorship are eligible for copyright protection regardless of their storage
medium.' " The Third Circuit in Franklin expressly followed CONTU's tenet
that the copyrightability of a computer program does not depend on the com-
municative value or purpose of the program. 7 The extension of copyright to
computer operating systems implements the fundamental policy of copyright
that society should encourage creative endeavor by allowing an author to pro-
fit from the author's creativity.' 75 The term "computer program," however,
is not a magical incantation that raises the copyright shield whenever a pro-
prietor seeks to obtain an exclusive right to vend his wares. To qualify for
copyright, a creative work of intellect must be a work of authorship and not
an idea, system, or process.'7 Since bootstart programs are conceptually and
physically inseparable from the computer hardware, courts should deny copy-
right protection to bootstart programs fixed in ROM."" Moreover, the fed-
eral courts should consider competitive and economic factors in determining
the dividing point between idea and expression. 78 As the Mazer decision in-
dicates, copyright's economic incentive to create and compete constitutes the
underlying policy of the copyright law. 79 Since the extension of copyright
protection to computer software represents a form of economic regulation,
the courts should consider the economic effects of granting monopolies on
certain types of programs in determining the scope of copyright.
BRADFORD FROST ENGLANDER
171. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (copyright does not extend to ideas).
172. See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 23-25 (courts must limit scope of copy-
right since copyright constitutes monopoly power).
173. 714 F.2d at 1249; see supra notes 136-45 (copyright policy considerations support ex-
tension of copyright to ROM-based programs).
174. 714 F.2d at 1247-50; see CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 21 (copyright pro-
tects even those computer programs that produce no copyrightable output).
175. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218-19 (1954) (copyright seeks to encourage individ-
ual effort).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
177. See supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text (ROM-based bootstart programs are
not protectible works of authorship).
178. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text (economic considerations illuminate
division between idea and expression).
179. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (economic incentive to create constitutes
policy rationale for copyright).
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